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Abstract
This paper traces the common history of European legal scholarship from its beginning in the 
late 12th century to the development of national codifications which started some six centuries 
later. During this period, Roman law was of great importance in the universities, and Justinian’s 
Corpus Iuris Civilis was the central text for legal studies. We will look at the different approaches 
to this body of text that legal scholarship has taken over the years. Still, Roman law did not have 
a complete monopoly: we will have a look as well at Canon law and Moral Theology, which 
also developed a system of legal norms, but on an entirely different basis. They paved the way 
for Natural law, which – in a critical dialogue with Roman law – paved the way for modern 
codifications.
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1 Introduction
Europe is not a small place, its legal scholarship has a long history, and for many parts 
of Europe it is a common history. One may say that, for centuries, there was a European 
legal scholarship, until the appearance of national codifications caused lawyers to 
focus mainly on their own national law. This contribution will therefore focus on the 
period between the emergence of universities in continental Europe (starting with the 
legendary founding of the University of Bologna in 1088) and the development of 
national codifications of law from the 18th century onwards. It will be historical rather 
than methodological, if only for the simple reason that there has to be legal scholarship 
before we can look for a method in it and because the development of methodology as a 
specific branch of academic activity is only a relatively recent phenomenon.
 A significant part of the contribution will be devoted to the reception of Roman 
law. This implies a focus on private law – which may easily be defended, since private 
law has by far the longest history of all areas of the law. In continental Europe, Roman 
law, in the form of the Emperor Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis, was by far the most 
important element in legal training from the Middle Ages to the times of the national 
codifications, and as such it retains a certain importance even today. Moreover, with 
local laws and customs being rather fragmentary in most places, Roman law had a part 
to play in legal practice, as subsidiary law. This means that the Corpus Iuris Civilis 
was, for many centuries, the main point of reference for lawyers all over Europe, even 
if its exact role has varied with time. In the era of the Glossators (ca. 1100-1260) it was 
mainly a tool for university education, and much energy was spent on making it more 
readily accessible with their commentaries and through a system of cross-referencing. 
The School of Orléans, which blossomed in the 18th century, paved the way for a freer 
interpretation of its texts. The Commentators (or Post-Glossators, ca. 1260-1500) 
built on the methods of both the Glossators and the School of Orléans, and started 
to use the Corpus Iuris Civilis in legal practice as well, as a source of law – which 
raises interesting questions about the relative authority of statute law, local customs 
and Roman law. Legal Humanism (ca. 1500-1750) started to challenge the authority 
of Roman law by calling into question the textual basis of the Corpus Iuris Civilis 
through the application of a much more fundamental method of textual criticism. It also 
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introduced another methodological innovation in that it tried to arrange the texts of the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis in a logical system, that of Justinian’s Institutiones, which derived 
from the work of the Roman lawyer Gaius. A kind of synthesis of the methods of the 
Commentators and Legal Humanism was achieved in the Usus modernus Pandectarum 
(16th-18th centuries). And finally, the German Historical School and its offspring, the 
Pandectenwissenschaft, carried out a late but very important re-examination of Roman 
law in order to develop new technical concepts and an improved systematisation, which 
made possible the German codification of private law in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(BGB) of 1900.
 Roman law did not have a complete monopoly, however. Especially during the Middle 
Ages, canon law was another important part of the curriculum in the universities. It 
made a major contribution to the development of legal procedure. In the field of private 
law, it helped to develop a general law of contract and a general concept of tort/delict. 
Key to these important contributions was the influence of moral theology, especially 
that of the works of Thomas Aquinas. The application of principles of moral theology 
to law blossomed especially in the Spanish School of Salamanca (16th century), which 
in turn had considerable influence on natural law. Canon law and moral theology form 
an interesting contrast to Roman law: their approach is based on general principles, 
unlike Roman law, which mostly consists of case-law originating in a system of specific 
actions.
 Natural law is a third important approach to law. It is already present in canon law 
and moral theology in the shape of general principles with an essentially theological 
background. Secularised by Hugo Grotius and turned into a rational approach to law in 
the 17th century, it became a competitor for Roman law in the universities, where chairs 
for natural law were established in the late 17th and 18th centuries. It contributed to the 
criticism of Roman law and paved the way for the national codifications that were the 
eventual outcome of the Enlightenment.
 As we provide a more detailed overview of the reception of Roman law below, we 
will devote special attention to two interesting, methodological points. First, if Roman 
law was so important as a vehicle for legal teaching, to what extent did it earn a place 
in practice, where it had to compete with statute law and customary law? What exactly 
was its place among the possible sources of law that a judge would apply to the case he 
had to decide? Second, how did legal scholars who were trained in Roman law, which 
is essentially case-law, manage to eventually develop codifications of private law that 
consist of general rules forming part of a system of law?
2 Roman Law; Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis
There is a continuous line of development of legal scholarship on the European 
continent, starting in the Middle Ages. The starting point lies in Bologna, a university 
founded against the background of the power struggle between the German emperor 
and the pope and the rise to prosperity of many cities in Northern Italy. Following 
Charlemagne’s example, the German emperor presented himself as the successor to 
the Western Roman emperor, and found a certain amount of support for his claims to 
power in the Roman legal texts. The Emperor Frederick Barbarossa employed a large 
number of Bolognese lawyers to determine his exact rights in Italy. And the economic 
growth of the cities meant increasing employment for lawyers, not least in the function 
of podestà: an outsider – not a member of one of the local rivalling families – as the 
highest magistrate, someone who of course needed to have a solid legal training. This 
was the market that the University of Bologna – and others, of course – catered for.
 The central text in legal education, especially in the early centuries, was the major 
text of Roman law: the Corpus Iuris Civilis of the (Eastern) Roman Emperor Justinian 
(527-565). Under his aegis, three important works were compiled in 528-534 in 
Constantinople: the Codex Justinianus (first published in 529 and in a revised edition 
in 534, containing legal advice and decisions issued by Justinian’s predecessors and 
by himself), the Institutes (an introductory work for beginning students, but with force 
of law, based on the Institutes of the Roman jurist Gaius written around 160 AD) and 
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the Digest (or in Greek: pandectae; a collection of fragments from the works of the 
Roman jurists of the classical period, ca. 100 BC-250 AD, issued as one constitution 
of Justinian). After the publication of these works, Justinian continued to issue new 
constitutiones which are called Novels (novellae); a collection of 168 of these together 
with the three works mentioned earlier forms what is called the Corpus Iuris Civilis.1
 The Institutes, Digest, Codex and a collection of Novels extant at the time were 
taken to Italy when Justinian’s generals had managed to gain control over a good part 
of it in a campaign that had started in 534. The texts were given force of law in Italy, 
supposedly at the request of Pope Vigilius, in 554.2 Little is known about their exact fate 
during the next five centuries. What is certain, however, is that towards 1100 Justinian’s 
Corpus Iuris Civilis formed the basic text for legal education in civil law3 as this was 
taking shape in the Studium of Bologna. Legal education at university spread across the 
European continent, and its tradition remains unbroken until today. For much of that 
period, the Roman legal texts formed the mainstay of the legal curriculum.4
 We will first look at the way the Roman legal texts were used in teaching at medieval 
universities. It is common to distinguish three – not radically, but still – different 
approaches to the Roman texts: that of the Glossators, the School of Orléans and the 
Commentators. We will follow this distinction and treat all three in turn.
3 Glossators5
The beginning of this first period is traditionally put at 1088, the year considered by 
the University of Bologna to be the year of its foundation. The end is the death in 1263 
of Accursius, who brought together the glosses produced during the first century and a 
half of legal scholarship in his Glossa ordinaria around 1260. Of course, this does not 
mean that the methods employed by jurists suddenly changed dramatically after 1263 
– though it is true that the writing of new glosses went out of fashion after Accursius.
 Much of the work done by scholars from this period consisted in writing glosses to 
the text of the Corpus Iuris Civilis. The glosses – notes in the margins and sometimes 
between the lines of the Justinianic texts – range from simple explanations of words and 
alternative readings of the text to thorough analysis of the legal contents. They provide 
the professor with material for his classes. The Glossators made the first efforts to come 
to grips with the rather unstructured work that the Corpus Iuris is. Apart from providing 
commentaries in their glosses, they set up a system of references (allegationes) that 
made it easier to relate texts on the same subject matter from the Institutes, Codex, 
Digest and Novels to each other. In accordance with Justinian’s instructions, they tried 
to interpret the texts in such a way that no contradictions – Justinian’s compilers had 
actually left plenty of these – remained.6 This they achieved by grouping together the 
texts in favour of and against a certain argument or rule, and then interpreting some 
texts as the rule and others as the exceptions to it by means of distinctions. The approach 
is essentially a-historical: the Glossators studied the Corpus Iuris Civilis as one body 
of authoritative texts and were not interested in the inscriptiones of the Digest, which 
provide information about individual jurists and make it possible to give each his own 
place in the historical development of Roman law.
 Apart from the glosses, there are several other types of legal literature, partly 
originating in the teaching of the Corpus Iuris Civilis at university.7 Some follow the 
1 J.H.A. Lokin and W.J. Zwalve, Hoofdstukken uit de Europese codificatiegeschiedenis (2006).
2 Sanctio pragmatica pro petitione Vigilii, to be found at the end of the Schoell and Kroll edition of 
Justinian’s Novels.
3 Civil law is used here as meaning the received Roman law, as opposed to canon law.
4 P. Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht (1958).
5 G. Wesenberg and G. Wesener, Neuere deutsche Privatrechtsgeschichte (1985) at 22-28; E. 
Cortese, Il diritto nella storia medievale. II: Il basso Medioevo (1995); H. Lange, Römisches Recht im 
Mittelalter, Band I, Die Glossatoren (1997); H. Schlosser, Grundzüge der Neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte, 
Rechtsentwicklungen im europäischen Kontext (2005) at 36-53.
6 Const. Tanta § 15; P. Stein, Regulae iuris. From Juristic Rules to Legal Maxims (1966) at 131-132.
7 P. Weimar, ‘Die legistische Literatur und die Methode des Rechtsunterrichts der Glossatorenzeit’ 
(1969) 2 Ius Commune 43-83; P. Weimar, ‘Die legistische Literatur der Glossatorenzeit’ in H. Coing (ed.), 
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ordo legum, that is, they treat the texts in the order in which they are found in Justinian’s 
works. This is the case for the commentum, later called lectura, which is essentially a 
report of the lectures given by a professor, written down by an experienced student 
or assistant and sometimes revised by the professor himself. The older commentum is 
normally somewhat condensed, whereas the lectura is a full report of all what was said 
and done in the lecture hall, including remarks of the reportator about the behaviour of 
the students and the stories, jokes and gossip about their colleagues that the professors 
would tell to enliven their lectures. Another type of literature is the written record of the 
quaestio disputata: this was meant to teach students to analyse a problem and to argue 
their case in a structured plea. The question could either be a purely theoretical one or 
one taken from legal practice.8
 Another kind of commentary, which does not have its origin in the classroom, is the 
summa. Summae are summaries, mostly of entire titles of the Corpus Iuris. Unlike the 
commenta or lecturae, they are systematic works, even if the system does not extend 
beyond the scope of the title in hand. The oldest ones are not from Bologna, and many 
are from France – the reason being that the production of books was less well organised 
there than in Bologna. Azo wrote a number of summae on different parts of the Corpus 
Iuris, to which others were added during the first half of the 13th century, to form a 
standard summa on the entire Corpus Iuris. No new summae were written after that.9 It 
must be stressed that the summae are different from the commenta and lecturae in that 
they do not follow the order of the text in the Corpus Iuris but – at least within the title 
they treat – establish their own order and system to treat the fragments within the title. 
To some extent, the summae paved the way for the later systematic approach of the 
Legal Humanists.
 Apart from these works, there were also short monographs about specific topics: 
summulae or tractatus. And an important category is formed by the literature about the 
law of procedure: ordines iudiciarii. The Corpus Iuris Civilis does not contain a specific 
comprehensive section on the law of procedure; the ordines iudiciarii sought to compile 
all the relevant material on procedure in general and on specific actions, and provided 
instructions on how to produce a writ. One of the most influential works of this kind is 
the Speculum iudiciale of Wilhelmus Durantis (± 1270).
 The Glossators saw Justinian’s Corpus Iuris as valid law for their own time, since it 
was of imperial origin. Consequently, they did not hesitate to add constitutions of the 
German Emperors Frederick Barbarossa and Frederick II to the Codex. Apparently they 
had no problems with accepting the validity of texts from a fairly distant past in their 
own day. And not because they were ivory tower jurists unaware of the realities of legal 
practice: many Glossators can be shown to have been active as legal advisers, advocates 
or judges. However, little or nothing of their practical experiences shines through in 
their commentaries on the Corpus Iuris, which remained a rather isolated object of their 
academic interest: they did not pay attention to legal norms outside it, like statute law or 
customs. If they used the Corpus Iuris in practice – which in itself is not unlikely – the 
fact has remained unrecorded in their writings.
 There was a strong connection between the Glossators and the emperor, in the sense 
that Roman law provided the emperor with a historical basis for his claim to power. 
Charlemagne (742-814) had been the first to claim that he was in fact the heir to the 
throne of the Western Roman emperor – much to the dismay of the Byzantine emperor – 
and this ideology had been taken up again by Otto I (912-973) when he became German 
emperor in 962.10 Frederick Barbarossa (1122-1190, emperor since 1152) employed 
a good number of Bolognese professors as his legal advisers in his conflicts with the 
Italian cities and granted them privileges, e.g. exemption from ordinary jurisdiction 
Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privat rechts geschichte. I: Mittelalter 
(1100-1500), Die gelehrten Rechte und die Gesetzgebung (1973) at 129-258.
8 F.P.W. Soetermeer, ‘Une catégorie de commentaires peu connue. Les “commenta” ou “lecturae” des 
précurseurs d’Odofrède’ (1991) 2 Rivista Internazionale di Diritto Comune 47-68.
9 A famous phrase about it is chi non ha Azzo non va a palazzo – he who doesn’t have Azo should not go 
to the Palace (of Justice). See E.J.H. Schrage, Utrumque Ius. Eine Einführung in das Studium der Quellen 
des mittelalterlichen gelehrten Rechts (1992) at 58-59.
10 Koschaker, above n. 4, at 38-54.
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(Authentica Habita).11 However, one thing that neither Frederick Barbarossa nor his 
successors ever did was declare Justinian’s Corpus Iuris to be valid law. The legend that 
Roman law had been introduced in Germany through a law of the Emperor Lothar II 
(1125-1137) has been proven to be false by Conring.12
 Irnerius († after 1125) is the oldest Glossator to whom certain glosses can be 
attributed. Differences of opinion among Glossators can be demonstrated as early as the 
12th century, with Bulgarus de Bulgarinis (†1166) and Martinus Gosia (†ca. 1160) – two 
of the so-called Quattuor Doctores – as famous adversaries. Bulgarus eventually turned 
into a kind of founding father of the ‘mainstream’ of the Glossators, who stuck closely 
to the text in their interpretation, with Martinus and his pupils representing the dissident 
line, which preferred a more liberal interpretation based on the principles of good faith, 
possibly inspired to some extent by canon law. Bulgarus’ pupil Johannes Bassianus was 
the teacher of Azo (†ca. 1220), who in turn was the teacher of Accursius (†1263). The 
latter is responsible for what came to be the culminating work of the period: around 
the middle of the 13th century he compiled a dense apparatus13 of glosses on the entire 
Corpus Iuris, using all the material that had been prepared since the beginning of the 12th 
century. This Glossa ordinaria or Accursian Gloss became the standard commentary on 
the Corpus Iuris for many centuries to come. With it, writing glosses had reached its 
zenith and the attention of legal scholars shifted to different approaches, made possible 
because the Corpus Iuris had by now been completely cross-referenced and provided 
with a full commentary.
4 Methodological Aspects: The Scholastic Method;14 Sources
The essential medieval scientific method is the scholastic method, or dialectics: formal 
logic applied to an authoritative text. Just as the theologians dealt with the Bible as 
their main text, and the students of Medicine with Galenus, the jurists had the Corpus 
Iuris of Justinian. The objective was to be able to read the text as a logical unit. In the 
case of the Corpus Iuris, this involved finding a way of harmonising texts containing 
opposite opinions about or solutions for the same legal problems. In the introductory 
constitutions to his codification, Justinian had foreseen this problem of antinomiae, and 
had given the legal world the imperial solution: that in fact there were none, provided 
one interpreted his books with sufficient subtlety. This is exactly what the medieval 
civilists15 set out to do. The same happened in canon law: the very title of Gratian’s 
Decretum (Concordia discordantium canonum) indicates that it is about harmonising 
texts that disagree with one another – see below.
 The formal logic applied was largely based on a work by Abélard, Sic et non, written 
around 1120. This was an important and influential book, in which Abélard applies 
the principles of formal logic laid down by Aristotle16 to texts of the Church fathers. 
He juxtaposes contrasting texts, points out the differences of opinion and treats them 
in a critical, dialectic manner without giving a final decision. Sic et Non contains a 
philological method applied to authoritative texts. It raises a series of common doubts: 
has the text been corrupted, has the author made a mistake, do we really understand 
11 W. Stelzer, ‘Zum Scholarenprivileg Friedrich Barbarossa’s (Authentica “Habita”)’ (1978) 34 Deutsches 
Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters 123-165.
12 H. Conring, De origine iuris germanici (Helmstedt 1643). Two centuries earlier, the Italian Humanist 
Lorenzo Valla had proved that the famous Donatio Constantini, which supported the claim that the Emperor 
Constantine had transferred power over the Western Roman Empire to the Pope when he set up a new 
capital in the East, was in fact a forgery. See W. Setz, Lorenzo Vallas Schrift gegen die Konstantinische 
Schenkung (1975).
13 An apparatus being a full commentary – as opposed to incidental glosses – which fills the margins 
around the text.
14 M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode I-II (1909-1911; reprinted 1961); G. Otte, 
Dialektik und Jurisprudenz, Ius commune, Beiheft 1 (1971).
15 I.e. lawyers working in civil law, as opposed to canonists.
16 That is, the works of Aristotle that were known at the time: the Logica vetus. This consisted of Latin 
translations, partly made by Boethius in the 5th century, and by further translations of Arabic translations.
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him?17 Texts are grouped in function of their similarity (similia) or contrariety 
(contraria) and reasoning per analogiam or a contrario is applied, with distinctions 
(distinctiones) being established that explain the differences between the groups. This 
so-called scholastic method could be applied to any authoritative text, whether in the 
field of theology, medicine, philosophy or law, and it reigned supreme in the Middle 
Ages, without, however, becoming extinct in later ages – in fact, it remains an important 
part of legal reasoning to this very day.
 As far as the sources of law are concerned, Schrage notes that among civil lawyers 
in the Middle Ages there was no specific hierarchy of the sources of law. There was 
a distinction between civil and natural law, but neither of the two was seen as more 
important than the other. It is not until Azo in the Summa that anyone puts forward the 
idea that some sources of law are more important than others: Azo – remarkably for a 
civil lawyer – singles out the decisions of the great Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, 
Ephesus and Chalcedon as more important than other rules. It seems that the idea 
of a hierarchy of sources of law has a Christian background, and through canon law 
influenced medieval civil law as well.18
5 School of Orléans19
The School of Orléans may be traced back to 1235 as a place where legal education 
was organised; it was upgraded to a university in 1306. It had already won fame in 
the 13th century: Thomas Aquinas mentions Paris, Bologna, Salerno and Orléans as 
the four great studia generalia of his day. The first professors were Frenchmen and 
Italians who had studied at Bologna, and may well have belonged to the opponents 
of Accursius. Later there were some important figures who had had their training in 
France, like Jacques de Revigny (Jacobus de Ravanis, †1296) and Pierre de Belleperche 
(Petrus de Bellapertica, †1308). They had more interest in legal theory than the Italian 
Glossators and a more historical approach to the Roman legal texts. Revigny is known 
to have criticised the Glossators for sticking too closely to the text of the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis and for ignoring the ratio of a given passage. The members of the School of 
Orléans also had their eyes wide open for legal practice: they gave examples taken from 
contemporary cases. And they contributed to non-Roman areas of law, like international 
private law and penal law.
 In their approach to Justinian’s Corpus Iuris, they were generally more original 
than the Italian Glossators, and they treated its texts with more freedom. Revigny 
and Belleperche are known to have considered the views of canon law. An important 
innovation by Revigny was the creation of the legal person – later to become known as a 
persona repraesentata among the Commentators in Italy. It must be noted, however, that 
this particular subject was extensively treated by canon law as well; Revigny appears to 
have shared an interest with canon lawyers for a number of different topics.
 Eventually, the works of the School of Orléans were to form a source of inspiration 
for the Commentators in the 14th century; Cinus de Pistoia, in particular, speaks with 
great respect about Revigny and Belleperche and quotes them frequently. Though it 
continued to be an important centre of learning in France, the heyday of the School of 
Orléans was apparently over by then – although this may also be due to the fact that the 
later period of the history of this school remains rather underinvestigated.20
17 J. Huizinga, ‘Abaelard’ Handelingen en levensberichten van de maatschappij der Nederlandsche 
letterkunde te Leiden 1934-1935 [s.a.] 66-82 at 78.
18 E.J.H. Schrage, ‘Rechtsquellen aus der Sicht der Glossatoren’ in Iuris vincula. Studi in onore di Mario 
Talamanca (2001) VII 409-424 at 416 and 423.
19 E.M. Meijers, ‘De universiteit van Orléans in de XIIIe eeuw’ (1918-1919) 1 Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis 108-132 and 443-488, (1920-1921) 2 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 460-
508; French translation in Meijers, Études d’Histoire du Droit I-IV, R. Feenstra and H.F.W.D. Fischer 
(eds.) (1956-1966) III, 3-148; Wesenberg and Wesener, above n. 5, at 29; H. Lange and M. Kriechbaum, 
Römisches Recht im Mittelalter. Band II, Die Kommentatoren (2007) 130-137, 518-567.
20 Only recently has a thorough study on the School of Orléans in the 14th century been published: 
M. Duynstee, L’enseignement du droit civil à l’université d’Orléans du début de la guerre de cent ans 
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 The Ultramontani (the French lawyers at Orléans, but also at Montpellier and 
Toulouse) used essentially the same methods as their Italian colleagues at Bologna, 
even if they may have been a bit more adventurous in applying them, and wrote the 
same types of legal literature. Many summae were written in France, perhaps because 
book production was less well organised there, meaning that copies of the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis were not readily available.21
 One genre that blossomed especially at Orléans was the repetitio: a separate lecture 
on especially difficult texts. These were not treated in the context of the normal lectures, 
but at another time, in the afternoon. During the repetitio, the central text (sedes 
materiae) was studied in connection with other texts, which in the end often gave rise 
to a complete and systematic treatment of a certain theme. Some form of systematic 
treatment of the law is therefore also found in the School of Orléans.
6 Post-Glossators, Commentators and Consiliators22
The representatives of the direction that legal scholarship took after the Glossators 
are often simply called Post-Glossators – a name that apparently does not give them 
much credit for any achievements in their own right. A more favourable name would be 
Commentators, and – with reference to the important activity of many of them as legal 
advisers who wrote consilia – Consiliators has been suggested as well. There is no clean 
break; the Commentators built on the work of the Glossators and the School of Orléans. 
The three most important figures among the Commentators are Cinus de Pistorio 
(†1336), whose tribute to Revigny and Belleperche has already been mentioned, Bartolus 
de Saxoferrato (±1314-1357), a pupil of Cinus, and Baldus de Ubaldis (±1327-1400). 
Bartolus became the emblematic lawyer of his time, immortalised in the expression 
nemo iurista nisi Bartolista – nobody is a lawyer unless he is a follower of Bartolus.
 Accursius’ Glossa ordinaria is the watershed between Glossators and Commentators. 
It is the culminating point of a century and a half of legal learning, but also forms a point 
of reference for the future. The new era of the Commentators saw more involvement 
with legal practice, a further development of the dialectic method – helped by the fact 
that new translations of the works of Aristotle, some of them unknown thus far (Logica 
nova), became available – and the spreading of the learned law (Ius commune) across 
Europe.
 The time of the Commentators saw the true beginning of the reception of Roman 
law. With economic prosperity and development in the Italian cities during the 11th-13th 
centuries, the need for legislation had been met by local authorities with a great mass of 
local statutes. Together with all sorts of local customs, this did not make the picture any 
simpler: sources of law were many, inconsistent and incomplete. Given this situation, 
Roman law had a part to play as a more complete legal system in the background, a 
framework that could serve to assign local statutes and customs a place within a greater 
whole. At the same time, lawyers with university training in Roman law were ready to 
meet the demand for legal expertise in everyday practice. Legal thinking along Roman 
lines became increasingly important, a development both promoted and underlined 
by the establishing of high courts of law that were manned by lawyers schooled at 
university: the Parlement de Paris (1273), the Great Council of Malines (1473) and the 
Reichskammergericht (1495). The fact that Roman law was of imperial origin was an 
important factor, but it started to impose itself by the sheer weight of its intellectual 
authority as well.
(1337) au siège de la ville (1428), Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte 253 (Frankfurt am Main 
2010).
21 On the organisation of book production in the Middle Ages, see F.P.W. Soetermeer, Utrumque ius in 
peciis: die Produktion juristischer Bücher an italienischen und französischen Universitäten des 13. und 14. 
Jahrhunderts (2002).
22 N. Horn, ‘Die juristische literatur der Kommentatorenzeit’ (1969) 2 Ius Commune 84-129; N. Horn, 
‘Die legistische Literatur der Kommentatoren und der Ausbreitung des gelehrten Rechts’ in Coing, above 
n. 7, at 261-364; Wesenberg and Wesener, above n. 5, at 28-39; Lange and Kriechbaum, above n. 19. 
Following Lange and Kriechbaum, the name Commentators will be used.
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 The increased attention for legal practice is visible in the genre of the quaestio 
disputata: from the middle of the 13th century onwards, the Bolognese professors 
increasingly based their quaestiones on local statute law or even customary law, which 
were thus analysed by means of the methods of civil law.
 Giving legal advice and being active in legal practice was not necessarily a new 
development that started with the Commentators, but they certainly showed more of 
their practical activities in their writings. The consilium – the academic advice of a 
law professor on a practical problem – became probably the most important form of 
legal literature of the time. Baldus made a name for himself as consiliator; according 
to the – not entirely reliable – printed editions, he wrote almost 2500 consilia. Judges 
were often obliged to ask for a consilium before giving their decision. In the consilia, 
the difficult mixture of local statutes and customs is tackled through the techniques of 
interpretation and argumentation of the Roman lawyers. In other words, through the 
consilium the science of Roman law based on the Corpus Iuris acquired an important 
influence on legal practice. Roman law was used as the main argument; statute law was 
treated within its context, mainly as a deviation from it, and experienced a Romanising 
influence as a result.
 Typical of the Commentators is also that they were more inclined to take their 
cue from a specific theme or question (materia) rather than from a text of the Corpus 
Iuris. The corresponding form of literature is the tractatus, which consequently is not 
structured in function of the texts of the Corpus Iuris; the structure follows from the 
materia and incorporates texts from the Corpus Iuris as they fit the arguments and 
counter-arguments. Thus, the Commentators worked further towards a more synthetic 
and systematic use of the texts of the Corpus Iuris. A useful tool for them to achieve this 
was the last title of the Digest: De diversis regulis iuris antiqui, about different rules 
of ancient law. It contains 211 fragments which each consist of one or more rules or 
maxims. This title was considered to be a kind of summary of the entire contents of the 
Digest.23
 In the time of the Commentators, there was a stronger connection between civil law 
and canon law. Baldus, for instance, wrote commentaries both on Civil and canon law. 
In the 14th century, it became customary for students to study both subjects and thus 
become doctor utriusque iuris, doctor of both laws.
7 Canon Law24
During the Middle Ages, canon law was every bit as important as civil law, both in 
practice and at university, specifically in the fields of family law, contracts, testaments 
and the law of civil procedure. Canon law courts had a far from negligible jurisdiction.
 Originally, canon law had no manageable corpus of text comparable to civil law’s 
Corpus Iuris Civilis. This changed around 1140, when a monk called Gratianus made 
a collection of texts of very diverse origin – writings of the Church fathers, decisions 
of Councils, texts from the Bible – which is officially called Concordia discordantium 
canonum (harmonisation of disagreeing canones), but is usually known as the Decretum 
Gratiani. Given the character of its source material, it gained great authority, even if it 
was only a private collection and not an official codification. It provided a comprehensive 
and systematic collection of canon law, trying to bring together all the law of the Church 
into one systematic whole.
 After the publication of the Decretum, the popes kept making laws, taking 
administrative decisions and giving sentences as judges. These texts (decretales) were 
later gathered together in other collections. The Liber Extra is a collection of decretals 
in five books, published in 1234 by Pope Gregorius IX. It was followed in 1298 by a 
collection of decretals of Bonifatius VIII (and his predecessors), called the Liber Sextus. 
Both these collections are real codifications of canon law: they were officially issued as 
23 Stein, above n. 6, at 148.
24 K.W. Nörr, ‘Die kanonistische Literatur’ in Coing, above n. 7, at 365-382; Schrage, above n. 9, at 90-
109. See also J. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (1995).
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such by these two popes, and to make sure that they would be applied in practice they 
were sent to the university of Bologna with the urgent recommendation that students 
of canon law should study them and apply them in practice after their studies. Together 
with the Decretum they form the bulk of the Corpus Iuris Canonici, which additionally 
contains decretals of Pope Clemens V dating from 1317 (Clementinae), decretals 
(Extravagantes) of Pope Johannes XXII (1316-1334) and some more decretals of later 
popes (Extravagantes communes). These three further sets of texts were never officially 
issued as codifications and consequently did not quite have the authority of the earlier 
ones.
 In material law, canon law made a significant contribution to the development of 
a general law of contract. In civil law, contracts were treated as separate categories, 
each with its own action or actions that defined the legal consequences of the contract. 
An agreement that could not be brought under one of the predefined categories was no 
contract in civil law, and therefore – in principle – not actionable. Canon law applied the 
principle that all agreements should lead to actionable obligations: pacta sunt servanda, 
a famous phrase that can be traced back to the Council of Carthage of 348 AD25 and that 
was reinforced by a passage from the Gospel of Matthew (5:37): ‘But let your “Yes” be 
“Yes” and your “No” be “No”. Whatever is more than these is of the evil one.’26 In other 
words, a good Christian should always be true to his word.27
 The same general approach – as opposed to one based on specific actions – was 
applied by canon law, supported by moral theology, to the field of compensation for 
damage caused. Rather than applying a number of actions, each with its own specific 
and limited reach, canon law considered that anyone who through his fault (culpa) 
caused damage to another should pay the latter compensation. This eventually – Hugo 
de Groot’s work is an important link here, as we shall see below – led to the general 
approach we find in modern codifications, such as the French Code civil (Art. 1382) and 
the Dutch civil codes of 1838 (Art. 1401) and 1992 (Art. 6:162).
 Canon law – together with civil law – also did much for the development of the law 
of procedure. This was a particularly poorly treated subject in the Corpus Iuris Civilis, 
which contains no specific section on procedure in general – there are many smaller 
sections on aspects of the law of procedure, but they are scattered all over the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis. These smaller sections were eventually brought together into systematic 
overviews of the law of procedure, often called ordines iudiciarii. The most influential of 
these is the Speculum iudiciale of Wilhelmus Durantis (±1270). Canon law contributed 
much to the discussion about general principles of the law of procedure that helped to 
construct these ordines iudiciarii.
 The method of canon law is essentially the same as that of civil law.28 The official 
title of the Decretum expresses very well what it was about: reconciling apparently 
disagreeing texts so as to form one authoritative whole. This was done with the help 
of the well-known dialectics: through arguments per analogiam and a contrario and 
by establishing distinctiones that explained the differences between the texts that 
were in agreement with each other and those that expressed another view. There were 
summae as well, the most important one being written in the middle of the 13th century 
by Hostiensis – it is full of references to civil law, giving the author the well-deserved 
name of monarcha utriusque iuris, the king of both laws.
 Just like civil law, canon law ended up developing more or less systematically treated 
doctrines. It did so, however, on the basis of different source material – the Corpus Iuris 
Canonici – and while concentrating on different themes: especially the law of persons 
and family law.
25 The relevant text may be found in the Liber Extra: X 1:35:1.
26 Translation from World English Bible.
27 Cf. A. Söllner, ‘Die causa im Vertragsrecht des Mittelalters bei den Glossatoren, Kommentatoren und 
Kanonisten’ (1960) 77 ZRG Rom. Abt. 182-269 (partly reprinted in E.J.H. Schrage, Das römische Recht im 
Mittelalter, Wege der Forschung 635 (1987) 131-186.
28 Stein, above n. 6, at 132; cf. W. Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts in vergleichender Darstellung. Band 
I: Frühe und religiöse Rechte (1975).
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8 Moral Theology29
Moral theology is a branch of theology that concerns itself with moral questions, which 
it tries to answer in the light of the Christian faith. It is concerned with good and bad in 
human behaviour and typically centres more on what man is supposed to do than – as 
dogmatic theology does – on what he is supposed to believe. To that extent it comes 
quite close to law, which also concerns itself with questions of what is wrong or right, 
or what should be done in practical situations where people come into conflict with each 
other. Sources of moral theology are the Old and New Testament, but may also be found 
in a not specifically religious area, like philosophy, especially ethics, and natural law.
 The greatest figure in moral theology, without any doubt, is Thomas Aquinas (±1225-
1274). His most important work is the Summa theologiae, a manual for beginning 
students of theology on all aspects of the relationship between God and man. It contains 
many passages about legal subjects. In Part I, Thomas writes about natural law, defined 
as man’s participation in God’s eternal law, which can be discovered through reason. 
It is derived from general principles, like the promotion of good and avoidance of evil. 
Part II of the Summa contains Thomas’s ethics, which are to a large extent derived from 
the ethical works of Aristotle. Thomas was able to profit from recently made – possibly 
at his request – translations of the works of Aristotle by Willem van Moerbeke, which 
had made available several works that had not been in circulation before.
 Important for law is Thomas’s doctrine of restitution. Building on Aristotle’s Ethica 
Nicomachea, on the one hand, and on Saint Augustine, on the other, it states the very 
general principle that whenever anyone through his fault has caused another to have 
less than what is due to him, he must restore (restituere) the latter to his original 
position. When this is not physically possible, he must pay him a compensation in 
money. Causing damage to another is a sin (peccatum) which cannot be forgiven before 
restitution has taken place.30 This is a very general approach that fits a great number 
of different situations and may be applied to both contracts and torts or negligence. It 
is a totally different approach than that of Roman law, where specific actions with a 
limited reach determine both the law of contracts and that of the delicta privata. Thomas 
based himself on Aristotle’s concepts of iustitia distributiva and iustitia commutativa 
in the Ethica Nicomachea. The role of the iustitia distributiva is to establish an initial 
situation of equality, where every man has a position and goods in accordance with his 
worthiness and talents. Whenever this equality is disturbed, it is the role of the iustitia 
commutativa to rectify the situation and make sure that the initial order is restored. 
Legal actions, therefore, may be considered as individual manifestations of the general 
principle of iustitia commutativa.
 The thing to note about the doctrine of restitution is that it lays down a general 
approach to the law of obligations, equally applicable to the law of contracts as to the 
law of tort, negligence or delict. It is on a far higher level of abstraction than the Roman 
case-law built around the specific actions on a limited number of contracts and delicts.
9 School of Salamanca31
Moral theology continued to base itself on the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas (Thomism) 
for a long time, until early in the 16th century when the traditional ideas about man 
and his relationship with God and the world started to be challenged by Humanism, 
Protestantism and the discovery of the New World. The School of Salamanca took up 
these challenges and tried to provide an answer to them. It was a school of theologians 
29 R. Feenstra and L.C. Winkel, Vergelding en vergoeding. Enkele grepen uit de geschiedenis van de 
onrechtmatige daad (2002) at 15-17; the central text of Thomas Aquinas is Summa Theologiae, Secunda 
Secundae, Quaestio 62, art. 2 ad secundum; in his Opera omnia (1897) 42-43.
30 This idea is expressed in a letter by Saint Augustine incorporated in the Decretum Gratiani (C. 14 q. 6 
c. 1) and repeated in the regula Peccatum in the Liber Sextus (VI 5:12:4).
31 O.W. Krause, Naturrechtler des 16. Jahrhunderts. Ihre Bedeutung für die Entwicklung eines natürlichen 
Privatrechts, Diss. Göttingen 1949 (1982) 39-101; cf. G. Nufer, Über die Restitutionslehre der spanischen 
Spätscholastiker und ihre Ausstrahlung auf die Folgezeit, Diss. Freiburg im Breisgau (1969).
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and jurists who intended to reconcile Thomism with the new social and economical 
order. Its most famous representatives are Francisco de Vitoria (±1483-1546), Martín de 
Azpilcueta (1492-1586), Domingo de Soto (1494-1570) and Fernando Vázquez (1512-
1569). The main objects of study of the School were man and his practical problems of 
a moral, economical or legal nature.
 The School did important work in the field of economics; it is considered to be the 
founder of economic science.32 But for law it was at least as important. The members 
of the School developed a theory of natural law that yielded interesting conclusions: 
equality and human rights and the idea that sovereignty rests with the people, which 
can transfer it to the monarch. Vitoria developed a theory about ius gentium and thus 
became the founder of public international law. Another creation of the School are 
theories about just war. And finally, some of its members took part in the famous debate 
between Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de las Casas about the legitimacy of 
the conquest of the New World (Junta de Valladolid, 1550-1551).
 The ideas of the School of Salamanca reached the Netherlands (in the broad sense 
of the term) along different lines. One of these is the Jesuit Lenaert Leys (Leonardus 
Lessius, 1554-1623) of Louvain. During his studies in Rome he had met one of the 
members of the School of Salamanca, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) with whom he 
remained in correspondence. Lessius taught moral theology for years at the Jesuit 
studium at Louvain, introducing the ideas of the School of Salamanca. For the weekly 
debates about ethical questions he used a work by Martín de Azpilcueta (alias Doctor 
Navarrus, 1492-1586). He was known for his clear style of writing; one of his works 
was De iustitia et iure ceterisque virtutibus cardinalibus (1605). In the Northern 
Netherlands, it seems that Hugo de Groot (Grotius) was inspired by Domingo de Soto’s 
De iustitia et iure, which he had brought to him when he was a prisoner at Loevestein 
castle in 1619. He also quoted from the works of Azpilcueta. It was through Grotius that 
the general principles of moral theology would cross over from theology to law.33
10 Legal Humanism34
Legal Humanism – a new approach to civil law – was inspired by the general spirit of 
inquisitiveness and no longer taking things for granted that ended the Middle Ages and 
ushered in another era. It is characterised by a great interest in classical antiquity and 
a desire to get to know it directly from the sources. Rather than just studying the legal 
texts, the Humanists developed an interest in their historical and linguistic background.
 Legal Humanism had two periods during which it blossomed, in two different places: 
it started in France in the 16th century, especially at the University of Bourges. Some 
important figures who must be named in this context are Guillaume Budé (Budaeus, 
1468-1540), Andrea Alciato (Alciatus, 1492-1550) and Jacques Cujas (Cuiacius, 
1522-1590). More than a century later, it was prominent again in to the Republic of 
the Netherlands, roughly from 1670-1730. The young, prospering Republic attracted 
the interest of scholars from many countries through the high academic level of its 
antiquarian approach to the Roman legal sources, known as the Dutch Elegant School.35 
32 J. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (1954) 94-115.
33 See R. Feenstra, ‘L’influence de la scolastique espagnole sur Grotius en droit privé: quelques expé-
rien ces dans des questions de fond et de forme, concernant notamment les doctrines de l’erreur et de 
l’enrichissement sans cause’ in La Seconda Scolastica nella formazione del diritto privato moderno, 
Incontro di studio, Firenze, 16-19 Ottobre 1972, Atti [= Per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 1] 
(1973) at 377-402, reprinted in R. Feenstra, Fata Ivris Romani, Études d’histoire du droit (1974) at 338-
363.
34 G. Kisch, Humanismus und Jurisprudenz. Der Kampf zwischen mos italicus und mos gallicus 
an der Universität Basel (1955); H.E. Troje, ‘Die Literatur des gemeinen Rechts unter dem Einfluss 
des Humanismus’ in H. Coing (ed.), Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen 
Privatrechtsgeschichte. II: Neuere Zeit (1500-1800), 1. Teilband, Wissenschaft (1977) 615-795; Wesenberg 
and Wesener, above n. 5, at 60-71.
35 G.C.J.J. van den Bergh, Die holländische elegante Schule, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte von Humanismus 
und Rechtswissenschaft in den Niederlanden 1500-1800, Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte 148 
(2002).
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Perhaps the greatest figure is Gerard Noodt (1647-1725, professor at Leyden from 
1706), but outside the ranks of university professors we must also mention Henrik 
Brenkman (1681-1736), who worked for many years on a new edition of the Digest 
that he never managed to finish; his notes, however, form the basis of the important 
edition by Gebauer and Spangenberg,36 and Mommsen’s preface to his editio maior of 
the Digest owes much to Brenkman’s book Historia pandectarum.37
 With Legal Humanism, there began a completely different approach to the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis. The Legal Humanists were interested in the historical context of the texts 
of the Corpus Iuris and tried to read them against that background, relating them to the 
information provided by non-legal sources from antiquity. The typical publication in this 
field is the observatio, a short essay in (elegant) Latin making a specific point.38 Also, 
they tried to return to the oldest possible version of the texts and find the manuscripts that 
would help them to do so: ad fontes (back to the sources) sums up this approach. For the 
Digest, in particular, this meant an increased interest in the elusive Codex Florentinus, 
which was eventually reproduced in a kind of quasi-facsimile edition by Francisco and 
Lelio Torelli in 1553.39 Another innovation was that, unlike their medieval predecessors, 
Humanists did read Greek texts (Graeca leguntur),40 which enabled them, for instance, 
to use manuscripts of the Basilica41 to improve the text of the Corpus Iuris. The new 
historical and critical approach to the legal texts came to be known as the mos gallicus 
as opposed to the traditional Bartolistic method, the mos italicus.42 It was not necessarily 
welcome in legal practice; quite the contrary. Practical lawyers did not like any doubt 
being cast on the texts they used to base their arguments on.
 The Legal Humanists were also responsible for the beginnings of interpolation 
criticism and palingenesia. Interpolation criticism aims at eliminating the changes made 
to the legal texts from the classical period of Roman law (roughly 100 BC - 250 AD), 
when they were inserted into the Digest by Justinian’s compilers. This is not easy to do 
with any degree of certainty unless one has an uninterpolated text for comparison, and 
over the centuries some scholars have been overzealous in assuming interpolations. 
Whatever the merit of early interpolation criticism, it certainly strengthened the 
impression that the text of Justinian’s codification was anything but perfect.
 Palingenesia profits from the fact that every fragment of the Digest is provided with 
an inscriptio giving the name of the original author and where in which work of that 
author the fragment belonged. They allow a sort of reconstruction of the original works 
– always with the Justinianic text – to the extent that fragments from them were used 
in the Digest. The modus operandi is simple: separate all the fragments contained in 
the Digest, maintaining the inscriptiones, sort them by jurist and then for each jurist 
sort them by work and then by book (e.g. Ulpianus, libro octavo decimo ad edictum). 
The project was begun by Jacobus Labittus at the instigation of Cujas: he made a list 
of authors with references both to texts of those authors contained in the Digest and to 
36 Corpus iuris civilis … recensuit Georgius Christianus Gebauer, et post ejus obitum editionem curavit 
Georgius Augustus Spangenberg (1776-1797).
37 H. Brenkman, Historia Pandectarum seu Fatum Exemplaris Florentini […], Trajecti ad Rhenum, apud 
Guilielmum van de Water (1722). The Codex Florentinus is the manuscript of Justinian’s Digest, probably 
written in the 530s in Constantinople and therefore considerably older than the manuscripts normally used 
by the Glossators and Commentators. It was taken by the Florentines from the Pisans in 1406 and been 
jealously guarded in Palazzo Vecchio ever since; very few scholars at the time got a chance to see it.
38 Troje, above n. 34, at 671-689.
39 The famous Torelli edition is Digestorum seu pandectarum libri quinquaginta ex Florentinis pandectis 
repraesentati, curavit Laelius Taurellus, Florentiae, in officina Laurentii Torrentini (1553).
40 H.E. Troje, Graeca leguntur. Die Aneignung des byzantinischen Rechts und die Entstehung eines 
humanistischen Corpus iuris civilis in der Jurisprudenz des 16. Jahrhunderts (1971).
41 The Basilica are a Greek integrated version of Justinian’s Digest and Codex made by the Byzan tine 
Emperor Leo the Wise around the year 900. Its text contains many fragments of literal Greek translations 
of the Digest and Codex.
42 F. Carpintero, ‘“Mos italicus”, “mos gallicus” y el Humanismo racionalista. Una contribución a la 
histo ria de la metodología jurídica’ (1977) 6 Ius Commune 108-171.
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passages in the texts of other authors where they are mentioned. He did not yet try to 
restore the original order in the works of individual jurists; this was only done in the 19th 
century by Lenel, the author of a more definitive Palingenesia.43
 Given that Justinian’s compilers only retained 5 per cent of the available texts, the 
Palin genesia was never going to achieve a complete reconstruction of the original works. 
However, in the case of jurists of whose works much has been used, it is possible to get 
a good impression what the structure of a given work was. Thanks to the Palingenesia, 
separate Digest fragments may be read within their original context, which can be very 
helpful for their interpretation. Thus it serves both a legal and an historical purpose.
 Apart from this more antiquarian approach, there was also a tendency – already 
noticeable especially among the later Commentators but now becoming more important 
– to try and achieve a more systematic treatment of the contents of the Corpus Iuris. 
The medieval summae and repetitiones had introduced systematic treatment for one title 
at a time, but now it was attempted to present the entire Corpus Iuris as one systematic 
whole. Justinian’s Institutes were chosen as a model, since they are the only part of 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis containing a real system, derived from that of the Institutes of 
Gaius (ca. 160 AD).44 The most famous example of such a new systematic treatment 
is the commentary of Hugues Doneau (Donellus, 1527-1591),45 though the method 
was also applied to other material than the Corpus Iuris, notably by Charles Dumoulin 
(Molinaeus, 1500-1566) to the customary law of Paris (Coûtume de Paris) and by Hugo 
de Groot to the law of Holland.46
 Another point that affects legal methodology is the fact that the critical approach 
of the Humanists slowly but surely eroded the authority of Roman law. On the one 
hand, the hunt for new manuscripts had revealed many doubts about the exact wording 
of certain passages. On the other hand, the desire of the Humanists to re-establish the 
classical text of the Roman jurists suggested that the traditional Justinianic text was not, 
in fact, the real thing. This made Roman law vulnerable in the competition with other 
legal sources, especially natural law. Its authority, which had once rested on that of the 
(German) emperor, now came to be based on its intrinsic quality, where it had not been 
explicitly challenged. The change is summed up in a Latin play on words: Roman law 
applied non ratione imperii, sed imperio rationis (not for reason of its authority, but for 
the authority of Reason).47
11 Natural law48
During the 17th and 18th centuries, natural law became an increasingly serious competitor 
for Roman law, and it would eventually make an important contribution to the national 
codifications that would put an end to the direct application of Roman law in practice.49
43 J. Labittus, Index legum omnium quae in Pandectis continentur […] (1557); O. Lenel, Palingenesia 
iuris civilis, I-II (1889). 
44 It was impossible for them to use Gaius directly, because the text of his Institutes was not rediscovered 
until 1816.
45 Hugonis Donelli Iurisconsulti, Commentariorum de iure civili libri viginti octo […], Francofurti, apud 
Andr. Wecheli heredes, Claudium Marnium et Joan Aubrium, 1595-1597.
46 Ch. Dumoulin, Commentaria in consuetudines Parisienses (1539); Hugo de Groot, Inleidinge tot de 
Hollandsche Rechts-Geleertheyd (1631).
47 G.C.J.J. van den Bergh, Geleerd recht. Een geschiedenis van de Europese rechtswetenschap in 
vogelvlucht (2007) at 87.
48 C. von Kaltenborn, Die Vorläufer des Hugo Grotius auf dem Gebiete des Ius naturae et gentium, 
sowie der Politik im Reformationszeitalter (1848; reprinted 1965); Chr. Bergfeld, ‘Johann Gottlieb 
Heineccius und die Grundlagen seines Natur- und Völkerrechts’ in J.G. Heineccius, Grundlagen des 
Natur- und Völkerrechts (1994) 507-532; L. Danneberg, ‘Die Auslegungslehre des Christian Thomasius 
in der Tradition von Logik und Her me neutik’ in F. Vollhardt (ed.), Christian Thomasius (1655-1728). 
Neue Forschungen im Kontext der Frühaufklärung (1997) 253-316; H. Thieme, Das Naturrecht und die 
europäische Privatrechtsgeschichte (1954, 2nd ed.); H. Thieme, ‘Die Zeit des späten Naturrechts’ (1936) 56 
ZRG Germ. Abt. 202 ff.; H. Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit (1962, 4th ed.).
49 Schlosser, above n. 5, at 84-142.
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 The idea of natural law as an all-encompassing system of law may be traced back 
as far as the ancient Greek philosophers. Roman lawyers – under the influence of the 
Stoa – treated it as well, mainly as a body of law equally observed by all peoples, 
and therefore also called ius gentium. The Church father Aurelius Augustinus (354-
430) promoted the idea of a divine origin of the law, just after Christianity had become 
the state religion of the Roman empire (380). The Latin Bible thus became the main 
source of natural law. We have already seen that Thomas Aquinas (1224/1225-1274) 
later developed a legal philosophy – also inspired by the works of Aristotle (384-322) 
– which derived law from the ideal order of God’s creation (ordo Dei). During the 
16th century, as we have also seen, Thomas’s philosophy was adapted by the so-called 
Secunda Scholastica of the School of Salamanca. The Spanish doctrine of natural law – 
which maintained a theological basis – had an important influence on legal philosophy 
and even on dogmatic aspects of law, since it treated specific contemporary problems 
from a natural law point of view.
 The Dutchman Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) – who deserves to be singled out because 
of the important influence he had on other lawyers in various countries – continued 
the tradition of the School of Salamanca, but was responsible for an important change: 
he developed the idea of a rational natural law based on human intellect (ratio). In 
his famous and influential work De iure belli ac pacis (1625) he carefully states that 
even if we were so bold as to suppose that there is no God, there would still be valid 
natural law.50 The idea of a rational natural law was developed further by the German 
lawyer Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), who completely separated natural law from any 
theological foundation. Pufendorf built up a legal system more geometrico, by a method 
inspired on natural sciences, deducing its rules from a number of axioms.
 This rational natural law became an important source of criticism on Roman law. 
The monopoly of Roman law in university education was undermined by the institution 
of chairs in natural law from the middle of the 17th century onwards – a case in point 
being Pufendorf’s chair in Heidelberg (1661). In Germany, Christian Thomasius (1655-
1728) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754) developed it further. In France, Jean Domat 
(1625-1696) applied natural law principles in his book Les lois civiles dans leur ordre 
naturel (1689). The different designs for a natural law system paved the way for the 
codifications brought about by the political developments and events of the 18th century. 
An early one was the Bavarian Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus of 1756; it was followed 
in Prussia by the Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten (ALR, 1794), 
by the famous French Code civil (1804) and the Austrian Allgemeines Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (ABGB, 1811). Introduction of a codification always entailed putting an 
explicit end to the application of Roman law in practice – however, since it remained 
an important subject in most universities, its intellectual life as a legal lingua franca 
continued, and has done so until now.
12  Usus modernus Pandectarum51
If Legal Humanism was the fashionable way to work with the Corpus Iuris Civilis in 
the 16th and 17th centuries, in the background there were many more lawyers who used 
it from a purely practical point of view, continuing the medieval tradition of the mos 
italicus. The work of the Legal Humanists had made some difference through better 
50 De iure belli ac pacis, Prolegomena 11. About the influence of Hugo de Groot’s work on others, 
see R. Feenstra, ‘Grotius’ Doctrine of Liability for Negligence: Its Origin and Its Influence in Civil Law 
Countries Until Modern Codifications’ in E.J.H. Schrage (ed.), Negligence: The Comparative Legal History 
of the Law of Torts (2001) at 129-171.
51 A. Söllner, ‘Usus modernus Pandectarum’ in Coing, above n. 34, at 501-516; Wesenberg and Wesener, 
above n. 5, at 115-119; Schlosser, above n. 5, at 76-83; R. Voppel, Der Einfluß des Naturrechts auf den Usus 
modernus (1996); W. Wiegand, ‘Die privatrechtlichen Rechtsquellen des Usus modernus’ in D. Simon 
(ed.), Akten des 26. Deutschen Rechts historiker tages (1987) at 237-252; J. Schröder, ‘Die privatrechtliche 
Methodenlehre des Usus modernus’ in Simon, id., at 253-278; D. Willoweit, ‘Der Usus modernus oder 
die geschicht liche Begründung des Rechts. Zur rechtstheoretischen Bedeutung des Methodenwandels im 
späten 17. Jahrhundert’ in D. Willoweit (ed.), Die Begründung des Rechts als historisches Problem (2000) 
at 229-245.
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editions of texts, and historical arguments also made their way into practice to some 
extent, but the methods of the practitioners remained largely unaffected. In Germany, 
this practical approach came to be known as the Usus modernus Pandectarum, a name 
taken from the identical title of a book by Samuel Stryk (1640-1710), published in 1690.
 This is a wide-ranging term. In its broadest sense, it can refer to any modern and even 
contemporary use of Roman law – especially the Digest, also known as the Pandectae – 
as a source of law, such as we still find in South-Africa or Sri Lanka. In a narrower, more 
technical sense, it refers to the approach of positivist German lawyers in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. Superficially, it appears to be a continuation of the Bartolist method of the 
mos italicus; yet something had changed, largely due to the critical approach to Roman 
law initiated by the Legal Humanists. The Usus modernus Pandectarum developed 
a different doctrine about the sources of law. The tone was set by Hermann Conring 
(1606-1681) in his De origine iuris Germanici (1643), and Stryk also makes it clear in 
the introduction to his Usus modernus Pandectarum: whereas Roman law has a part to 
play as a source of law, the position of local law is now different: it is to be studied for its 
own sake. During the Middle Ages, lawyers had also found themselves having to deal 
with several sources of law, including Roman law and local law, but they would tend 
to look upon local law as an aberration from Roman law. The Usus modernus instead 
saw it as a further development of Roman law through custom. This approach ensured a 
much stronger position of local law in comparison to Roman law, which lost its pivotal 
position among the sources of law. Scientific study of local law began with the Usus 
modernus Pandectarum.
 As far as Roman law is concerned, the name Usus modernus Pandectarum is 
significant, especially the first two words. Usus implies that the aim is to apply Roman 
legal texts in practice and not to make a scientific study of them. Modernus further 
implies that it was related to what applied in contemporary law. The representatives of 
the Usus modernus may have taken some benefit from the work of the Legal Humanists, 
but they used the Roman texts unhistorically, as just another source of legal norms. It 
was not, incidentally, limited to Germany; many French and Dutch lawyers worked 
along the same lines. A case in point, to give but one example, is the well-known work 
of Simon van Groenewegen, De legibus abrogatis, in which he investigates which 
Roman law texts may still be considered to be applicable law in the Netherlands.52
 There was no consistency in the Usus modernus as to which Roman legal texts were 
thought to apply. Some Usus modernus lawyers were quick to assume that a Roman rule 
no longer applied, whereas others would presume its applicability and required proof of 
the contrary.53
13 The German Historical School / Pandectenwissenschaft54
It is an ironic twist of fate that the German codification, the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(BGB) of 1900, was profoundly influenced by the works of a man who in 1814 strongly 
argued against the feasibility of a codification. In that year, Professor Anton Friedrich 
52 S. van Groenewegen van der Made, Tractatus de legibus abrogatis et inusitatis in Hollandia vicinisque 
regionibus. Lugduni Batavorum, apud Davidem Lopez de Haro et Franciscum Moyar dum (1649). There 
is a recent edition with an English translation: B.Z. Beinart and M.L. Hewett, A Treatise on the Laws 
Abrogated and No Longer in Use in Holland and Neighbouring Regions by Simon à Groenewegen van 
der Made, I-IV (1974-1989). Groenewegen followed French examples, see L. Winkel, ‘Some Remarks on 
Groenewegen’s De legibus abrogatis and the Reception of the Roman Law of Sale’ in R. van den Bergh 
(ed.), Summa Eloquentia. Essays in Honour of Margaret Hewett, Fundamina, Editio specialis (2002) at 
271-275.
53 G.C.J.J. van den Bergh, Geleerd recht. Een geschiedenis van de Europese rechtswetenschap in 
vogelvlucht (2006) at 74 et seq.
54 Wesenberg and Wesener, above n. 5, at 170-213; U. von Lübtow, ‘Savigny und die Historische 
Schule’ in Festschrift zum 125 jährigen Bestehen der Juristischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin (1984) at 381-
406; Schlosser, above n. 5, at 143-156; J. Schröder, ‘Zum Einfluss Savignys auf den allgemeinen Teil des 
deutschen Bürgerlichen Rechts’, review of Horst Hammen, Die Bedeutung Friedrich Carl v. Savignys für 
die allgemeinen dogmatischen Grundlagen des Deutschen Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (1983) (1985) 14 
Quaderni Fiorentini 619-633.
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Justus Thibaut of Heidelberg had put forward the idea of carrying out a general civil 
law codification (including private, penal and procedural law) for Germany, in order to 
promote national political unity.55 He made no secret of his admiration for the French 
Code civil (which at the time applied in parts of Germany west of the Rhine). That same 
year, a Professor of Roman and Civil law in Berlin, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-
1861), wrote an eloquent and famous answer, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung 
und Rechtswissenschaft, in which he argued that Germany was not ready for codification, 
and that much work still needed to be done before a successful codification could be 
carried out in Germany.56 Whether the delay is entirely due to Savigny is debatable, but 
the fact remains that it took almost another century before the BGB came into force and 
Germany obtained its unified civil law.
 Savigny’s theory is a reaction to the pretensions of rational natural law as a product 
of the Enlightenment, just as Romanticism in art and literature was a reaction to the 
dry intellectualism of the previous era. He was, in fact, closely related to such famous 
German romantic figures as Von Arnim and Brentano, having married the latter’s sister 
Kunigunde in 1804. In Vom Beruf, Savigny laid down most of the programme for 
the Historical School, which he officially founded in 1815, together with his Berlin 
colleague Karl Friedrich Eichhorn (1781-1854). They edited the programmatic journal 
of the school, the Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft – the predecessor of 
the modern Savigny-Zeitschrift.
 In Vom Beruf, Savigny opposes the idea that law can be constructed in a mathematical 
way, more geometrico. In his view, the law of a nation is as characteristic of that nation 
as its language. It is not made for the people, but grows organically with the people; it is 
a historical phenomenon – Roman law being the most eminent example. A codification, 
therefore, can only be successful if it builds on the historical tradition of the law of the 
people, and intimate knowledge of this tradition is essential for carrying out the right 
codification. This knowledge of the historical tradition – or rather the lack of it – is 
pointed out by Savigny as the great weakness in Germany and, consequently, as the 
main obstacle to a successful codification. His conclusion is that the only way to achieve 
a better law for Germany is to have a legal scholarship that proceeds organically and 
studies the tradition from the beginning. And this is exactly what he and his pupils did, 
starting with the medieval reception of Roman law in Italy. In fact, Roman law – in 
its Justinianic form – was found to be an important common element in the law of 
many German countries, especially since it had been applied by the common German 
Supreme Court, the Reichskammergericht, since its foundation in 1495.
 Roman law, however, was studied not so much for its own sake, but with a view to 
the future. Savigny’s pupils used Roman law, and especially the Digest or Pandectae, 
to develop general notions that the Romans themselves had never used, like legal act 
(Rechtsgeschäft) or legal capacity (Geschäftsfähigkeit). This form of legal scholarship 
came to be known as Pandektenwissenschaft. One of its most famous representatives, 
Bernhard Windscheid (1817-1892), wrote a manual that has still not lost its importance, 
and he later became a central figure in the committee that would prepare the BGB. In 
the German BGB (1900), we find yet another form of reception of Roman law. The 
BGB certainly is a codification that is much more closely related to Justinian’s than, 
for instance, the French Code civil, even if it is almost a century further removed from 
Justinian in time. It is the most recent example of the influence of Roman law on the 
formation of modern private law.
55 A.F.J. Thibaut, ‘Rezension über August Wilhelm Rehberg, Ueber den Code Napoléon und dessen 
Einführung in Deutschland (1814)’ in Heidelbergische Jahrbücher der Litteratur, 7 (1814) at 1-32; 
and especially: A.F.J. Thibaut, Ueber die Nothwendigkeit eines allgemeinen bürger lichen Rechts für 
Deutschland (1814).
56 F.C. von Savigny, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1814).
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14 Concluding Remarks
It is intriguing to see how long Roman law has been a major point of reference both in 
legal practice and in the academic training of jurists in (continental) Europe – and that 
it remains so as a subject in the legal curriculum in many countries.
 Let us return to the two points that were raised at the end of the introduction to this 
article. As far as the role of Roman Law in legal practice goes, we have seen that the 
Glossators may have applied it, though there is too little evidence to say anything with 
any degree of certainty. The Commentators definitely used it, and even if the critical 
approach of Legal Humanism eroded its authority to some extent, the traditional method 
of the Commentators continued to be used, not only in Italy but elsewhere as well. The 
Usus Modernus is a somewhat modernised version of Roman law that incorporates part 
of the findings – especially textual corrections – of Legal Humanism. Roman law did, 
however, lose the self-evident imperial authority it had had during the Middle Ages due 
to its association with the emperor. The criticism of the Legal Humanists and natural 
lawyers meant that it eventually only applied to the extent that its intellectual content 
remained satisfactory. And to this extent it is often still present in modern codifications, 
albeit on the basis of a new authority.
 The second point is the development from case law to codifications with a system 
of legal rules at a relatively high level of abstraction. Roman law in its classical form 
consisted of case law – a characteristic, incidentally, that it shares with modern common 
law. Both Justinian’s Code and his Digest are collections of solutions of specific cases. In 
Roman times, these solutions did not have an automatic authority, as this would depend 
on the prestige of the author.57 However, they did play a part in future decision making 
that was similar to that of precedents in common law. During the reception process in 
the Middle Ages and later, Roman law was studied and treated in such a way that we 
eventually ended up with the civil law systems that we have today – which are, therefore, 
ultimately derived from a system based on case law. This is a very interesting evolution. 
From the preceding pages, we can see that there were probably two key contributing 
factors, one interior and one exterior. The interior factor starts in the medieval summae, 
where titles of the Corpus Iuris Civilis are treated in a systematic way. The grouping 
together of agreeing and contrasting texts around a sedes materiae made it easier to find 
the general rules and principles that were hidden behind the solutions to the cases. The 
rules and maxims of the last Digest title 50:17 (De diversis regulis iuris antiqui) were 
interpreted as a summary of the Digest in succinctly formulated rules and maxims that 
came to serve as general principles of law. And finally, the system atisation of the whole 
Corpus Iuris Civilis along the lines of the Institutiones made it possible to give all the 
rules and principles their logical place within a greater outline.58 The exterior factor is 
that canon law, moral theology and natural law tended to think much more in terms of 
general principles than Roman law did. Eventually this made possible the construction 
of systematic codifications of private law, in which a large amount of Roman law has 
found a place.
 All this underlines that the transition to national codifications – accompanied by 
the abolition of Roman law as a source of law – was a real paradigm shift in European 
legal scholarship. The focus of attention for lawyers was now the codification. In some 
countries, Roman law retained a place in legal education; in others, like France and 
Belgium, the fixation on the codification was complete: the École de l’Exégèse.59 Still, 
this does not mean that the common heritage of Roman law is now sure to slowly 
fade into oblivion. On the contrary, it seems to be making some sort of comeback. As 
the European Union aims to achieve greater uniformity in law and a number of study 
57 Stein, above n. 6, at 2.
58 See also J.W. Cairns and P.J. du Plessis (eds.), The Creation of the Ius Commune: From Casus to Regula 
(2008).
59 B. Bouckaert, De exegetische school: een kritische studie van de rechtsbronnen- en inter pre tatieleer bij 
de 19de eeuwse commentatoren van de Code Civil (1981).
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groups analyse the differences among European systems of private law in order to try 
and develop a European Civil Code, Roman law is getting renewed attention as the 
common element, and even as a possible source of solutions for the future.60
60 R. Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition Today 
(2001).
